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14 September 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Coordination Group Meeting, 13 September 1976 -- Chairing

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- 1. The Group met to consider two papers -- one by of OLC and one by the IC Staff (attached). Combined, these papers were to respond to a request from the Subcommittee on Charters and Guidelines of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), a request for a list of principles the Agency believed should guide the SSCI's review of the charters of the member organizations of the Intelligence Community.
- 2. The first issue to arise had to do with the specificity desirable in such a paper -- specifically, whether authorization for a contingency fund should be mentioned. The concensus seemed to be that a paper on principles should not be that specific.
- 3. Next, I pointed out that the proposal for revising the National Security Act of 1947 either did not give the Director responsibility for producing national intelligence, or else it required him to delegate the responsibility to the IC Staff. This point was never discussed; we immediately got into a debate over whether any CIA responsibilities should be transferred to the DCI, the Director already having full authority as head of the Agency to delegate the Agency's responsibilities as he sees fit.
- 4. The intent of those on both sides of the question was as follows: the DDO and IG were the most vociferous in arguing that to take any authorities of the CIA, to give them to the Director, and then to determine how he must delegate them, would needlessly and unwisely reduce the flexibility of future Directors.

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The IG later modified its position -- it became willing to transfer Agency responsibilities to the Director, but not to define how he must delegate them.

- 5. The Office of Legislative Counsel argued that, if we do not take the lead to conform legislation to Executive Order 11905, the Congress will do it piecemeal and improperly.
- 6. This debate was never resolved. The OLC representative fell back to the position that, for immediate purposes, we should inform the Subcommittee that we are interested in statutes to provide for two Deputy Directors, for powers to protect intelligence sources and methods, and for general adjustments in Central Intelligence authorities (see attachment, page 2). It was left up in the air whether a list of principles will ever be provided to the Subcommittee (Chief of Staff, Elliot Maxwell).

Executive Officer
National Intelligence

Attachments A/S

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5X1	l. I am sending you the list of proposed KIQs before circulating it to the NIOs in case you would like to quietly discuss individual KIQs with individual NIOs. Some submissions are rather good, particularly Howie's. And the balance is not bad for starters USSR - 7; ME - 3; LA - 3; and WE, Africa, Korea, and Proliferation - 1. On the other hand, we need to agree on a format, and several KIQs would not meet my definition of properly focused or amenable to action. Indeed, I suggested to that his KIQ on Panama was one of those that "goes without saying," but he wants it considered anyway. Quite a few KIQs need rephrasing. The Cuban KIQ, for example, should read: Where will Cuba intervene with its military and clandestine forces next? The African KIQ might better read: Where in Africa will thenext crisis erupt that will threaten US interests or lead to communist involvement and exploitation? I would be happy to have a go at rewriting, but I think it would be better if you could get the NIOs to do it themselves.
5X1	2. On the matter of KIQs and Perspectives, I was visited today by the Comptroller's Office, who was acting on instructions ultimately stemming from Knoche. Most immediately, Knoche wants our proposed KIQs submitted to the Comptroller for staffing out to CIA offices for concurrence, prior to our submitting the KIQs to NFIB principals. I told we had no plans to do so and that, indeed, I would recommend against doing so. I used as reasons the fact that we could hardly circulate the KIQs to the Agency without circulating them to other members of the Community. Once we did that, we would be under the same pressures we were before to expand the list of KIQs to justify every conceivable activity the Community engages in. I further opined that there would be ample opportunity for the Agency to adjust the KIQs once they were put on the NFIB principals' table. We ended in a standoff; he had no flexibility in his instructions, and he left saying that Knoche would approach you if he wished to
	pursue the matter.

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25X1	3. floated with me the idea that there should be a third part to Element I of the IC Staff's Planning System	
25X1	(Murphy's <u>proposal is fairly</u> near the top of your stack of reading material). In need for a set of requirements to supplement KIV and Objectives on grounds that the requirements	25X
	would allow the Community to identify resources that could be used in all possible contingency situations. Then, according to when we are asked what we are doing about	25X
25X1	we would have anticipated the question, wo line have arready have readjusted resources, and would be able to say what we had done. Ihow such requirements would be superior to present	
20/(1	informal arrangements and working through the DCI committees. Though I probed for quite some time, I couldn't find an answer, and Burk and I parted on my comment that I could not perceive the need.	

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